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Abstract 
The article seeks to elucidate some controversial problems of the formation of both civic and national self-
consciousness through analysing the politics of identity and citizenship, which has assumed increasing 
importance in Western and Eastern European countries. Citizenship is considered as a dynamic construct 
that should be viewed as a ‘process’ through which speciﬁ c rights and obligations are exercised. The 
central task, therefore, is to analyse the evolution of various conceptions of citizenship in the light of 
historical experience, continuity and change, as well as the process of transformation of the model of 
political education that has emerged within the framework of the liberal political culture of the 19th 
century and has continued to exert a great impact on the development of political discourse in the modern 
world. Special attention is given to the comparative analysis of the models of civic and national identity 
in the USA, Western and Eastern Europe, including post-communist Russia. The author argues that the 
conception of identity as well, as the criteria for its deﬁ nition, have become crucial in the discussion of 
problems of citizenship and political education. The issue remains whether an eﬀ ective model of political 
education alone, i.e. without active citizens’ involvement and support, can have the potential not only 
to transform a political culture, but also inﬂ uence the whole system of both secondary and university 
education. The ﬁ nal aim of the article is to prove the idea that a new conception of citizenship and political 
education could, in conditions of a deepening crisis, become the most important link binding civil society 
and the new content of the political making its way through corporative interests.
Keywords: citizenship, political education, nation-state, civil rights, national identity, political culture, 
ideological transformations.
Introduction
A citizen is a person who owes allegiance to a speciﬁ c government and is entitled to protection from 
that government and to the enjoyment of certain rights. It is widely recognized that eﬀ ective citizenship 
rests on a rigorous and viable system of civic education which informs the individual of his civil rights 
and obligations. The long-term trend, however, has been to enhance citizen rights without eﬀ ective 
articulation of citizen obligation. To restore a meaningful balance between the two is, in my view, the 
core issue in citizenship and civic education (Janowitz, 1985, p. IX).
With this well-known deﬁ nition of Morris Janowitz I would like to begin the discussion about 
some aspects of the modern conception of citizenship which seem to be the most crucial ones in a 
period when the rapprochement of positions between the Eastern and Western European countries 
after the failure of radical socialist experiments is creating prospects of fundamental political and 
ideological transformation all over the world.
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Until very recently, it was extremely unlikely to ﬁ nd any points of contact on the question of 
citizenship in Marxist and liberal literature (I mean, of course, not the legal content of the very notion 
of ‘citizen’ but the socio-political concepts of citizenship in general). Such incompatibility has always 
looked all the more strange because both the socialist and liberal treatments of this conception had a 
common ideological source in the tradition of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The idea 
of citizenship appeared then as an essential part of the arising civil society. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries civil society came to imply a form of universal citizenship 
within the nation-state, based on the one hand on the principles of individualism and on the other on the 
participation of these individuals in public life, a participation that was in turn based on the mutuality 
of citizens in the form of compacts, contracts, and the moral, economic, social, and political ties 
binding these individuals (Seligman, 1992, p. 111; cf. Maatsch, 2011, pp. 19-33; Bellamy, 2008, p. 13-18).
American or European model?
The USA — the ﬁ rst country where all these principles were most fully realised — has always been 
regarded as an ideal historical model of civil society. One can ﬁ nd, however, at least two points of 
deviation of the American model from the Western European one. The ﬁ rst point is the absence of 
a strong socialist movement. In Western Europe, the socialist movement arose and developed in the 
nineteenth century in response to the continued exclusion of the working class from full membership 
in the national community. The rights of association, freedom of speech and press, freedom to organise 
political parties and trade unions, and the right of franchise were denied to working class members 
in Western European societies. The result was a huge expansion of socialism in Europe (Seligman, 
1992, pp. 102-104; Beckett, 2006, pp. 22-64). As Seymour Martin Lipset noted, Where the working class 
was denied full political and economic citizenship strong revolutionary movements developed. Conversely, 
the more readily working-class organizations were accepted into the economic and political order, the less 
radical their initial and subsequent ideologies (Lipset, 1983, p. 2).
It is quite clear why socialist ideologists regarded the very idea of the existence of an autonomous 
civil society uniting free and equal citizens, who are independent of state power, as a mere ‘bourgeois 
ruse’ and elaborated the concept of an ideal society where the principles of citizenship would be on 
ﬁ rmer ground owing to the merging of civil and political spheres in a new harmonious community. 
Among the factors that predetermined the failure of socialism in the USA were the mobility and 
ﬂ exibility of the American political system, the speciﬁ c social base of the American socialist movement 
(for example, the absence of workers in its ranks), the open frontier, etc. However, the main factor 
was the American ideology
with its inclusive deﬁ nitions of citizenship and its integration of the working class as members of the 
national collective. More than anything else it was the very ideology of Americanism, its civil religion... 
that precluded the development of a socialist movement there. The uniqueness of this civil religion as a 
form of national identity, which in its very essence precludes a socialist ideology, was expressed by Leo 
Sampson as follows: ‘When we examine the meaning of Americanism we discover that Americanism 
is to the American not a tradition, or a territory, not what France is to a Frenchman or England to an 
Englishman, but a doctrine — what socialism is to a socialist’ (Seligman, 1992, pp. 108-110; cf.  Skocpol, 
1992, pp. 5-6).
This religious character of the foundation of national identity is a second point of deviation of the 
American model. The concept of identity and criteria for its deﬁ nition become, therefore, crucial in 
the discussion of the problem of citizenship. National identity implies a complex of similar conceptions 
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and perceptual schemata, of similar emotional dispositions and attitudes, and of similar behavioural 
conventions, which bearers of this ‘national identity’ share collectively and which they have internalized 
through socialization (education, politics, the media, sports or everyday practices) (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, 
& Liebhart, 2009, p. 4).
In modern scientiﬁ c literature, the noun ‘identity’ is used with a great variety of attributes. One 
can speak of mental, ethnic, ideological, class, state, power, defensive, cultural, sexual identities, etc. 
The main principle of an identity (an individual or a group one) is a relationship between Me and Not 
Me, We and Others, which gives rise to the following dilemma — acceptance and non-acceptance of 
these others.
National identity is usually deﬁ ned through associating [it] with some entity or entities and 
accentuating their diﬀ erences from the others (Burant, 1995, p. 1125). Sometimes such a deﬁ nition 
acquires diﬀ erent meanings — from sociocultural to  political ones, accentuating the orientations 
of political elites. For example, in the early 1990s, the intention of the governments of the Vysegrad 
Triangle to join the EU and NATO were interpreted by some analysts as an intention to develop a Central 
European Identity for their peoples and to help loosen the fetters that bound them to ‘Eastern Europe’ and 
then to ease their paths toward integration into European institutions (Neumann, 1993, p. 354). In this 
case the ‘Other’ for the Central Europeans was, of course, Russia.
If the notion ‘identity’ is to be used only for the description of structure of the ‘inner orientations’ of 
individuals and groups, one should separate this notion from various classiﬁ cation and identiﬁ cation 
models and constructions. Their results depend, as a rule, on how subjective is the perception of real 
political processes by scholars. For example, in the late 1960s when John Armstrong wrote an article 
on the Soviet nations, where he deﬁ ned the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians as ‘state nations’ in 
contrast to the Ukrainians and Belarusians, who were classiﬁ ed as mere ‘younger brothers’ because 
they were rural, low in education... low in geographic mobility and culturally close to the Russians, 
this evaluation was not, of course, the result of pure scientiﬁ c investigation but merely a literary 
paraphrase of the oﬃ  cial non-recognition of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact by the USA (Armstrong 
1968, pp. 21-22).
Three concepts of identity are crucial to the analysis of the problem of modern citizenship —
national identity, political identity, and civic identity. It appears that in the structure of orientations 
determining national identity, the principles of ethnic policy, which form attitudes towards aliens, 
immigrants, ethnic groups and minorities on the basis of the acceptance/non-acceptance dilemma, 
play a decisive role. The acceptance implies exclusion or inclusion. The latter presumes, in its turn, a 
choice between integration, coexistence or assimilation. Non-acceptance opens the door to ghettos, 
reservations, expulsion and physical extermination.
In modern scientiﬁ c literature, any systematic attempts at building models of national identity 
based on the diﬀ erent ethnic policy types are comparatively rare (Brubaker, 2004; Edensor, 2002; 
Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart, 2009). One example, which seems relevant to the questions discussed 
in this article, is the classiﬁ cation developed by Bourmeyster from the Centre for Slavic Studies at 
Stendhal University in Grenoble. Bourmeyster identiﬁ es four models of national identity: integration, 
apartheid (civilised and non-civilised), assimilation, and intangibility (Bourmeyster, 1994, pp. 28-30) 
(Table 1).
The classiﬁ cation cited above cannot be regarded as an indisputable one. But it helps to 
understand the interdependence between diﬀ erent models of national identity that have evolved over 
the long course of history and the unifying character of the modern concept of citizenship arising in 
contemporary Europe during the integration process.
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Table 1: The basic models of national identity
Aspects/ 
dimensions
1. Integration 2. Apartheid 3. Assimilation 4. Intangibility
State Nation-state under 
the rule of law. 
Non-Nation-State. The state deprived of 
the rule of law.
The State under the 
rule of law which 
recognises national 
identity based on 
blood relationship.
Nationality No racial or ethnic 
discrimination. 
Acquisition of 
nationality by birth or 
naturalization.  
Double nationality is 
possible. Coexistence 
of citizens living 
in ethnic groups 
recognised as 
fundamentally 
diﬀ erent ones.
The organic unity 
projected on the 
future.
Acquisition of 
quasi-impossible 
nationality outside 
this relationship. 
Double nationality is 
impossible.  
Minorities National or ethnic 
minorities are not 
accepted.
Recognition of ethnic 
minorities  but not 
national  minorities.
Ethnic minorities are 
oﬃ  cially recognised 
and regarded 
as ephemeral 
entities expected 
to  disappear in the 
process of X-isation 
(denationalization, 
dechristianisation 
etc.) by means of 
administrative or 
terrorist measures.
Aliens enjoy the 
same social rights 
as workers and 
occasionally certain 
civic rights are granted 
to oﬃ  cially registered 
ethnic minorities.
Modes of 
realisation
The realisation of this 
model presumes the 
unity of the people, 
where the term 
‘multinational state’ 
is non-applicable.
Pluralism provided 
by associated life. 
The guarantee of 
interethnic dialogue 
and cooperation. Co-
existence of churches, 
sects, congregations 
etc.
The process of 
Russiﬁ cation, 
Romanisation etc. 
on the pretext 
of international 
normalisation.
The policy of gathering 
of compatriots 
scattered outside the 
native land and the 
defence of identity, 
which is on the verge 
of disappearance in 
national enclaves 
abroad.
The potential 
dangers
Incapacity to manage 
integration processes, 
destabilization, 
forcible recognition 
of multiethnicity and 
of the existence of 
national minorities,  
racism, intolerance.
Incapacity to manage 
peaceful coexistence. 
Secession, the breakup 
of unions or self-
destruction during 
interethnic conﬂ icts 
without any prospects 
for a political solution.
Resistance of those 
who refuse to be 
converted to new 
men or defend their 
identity as an ethnic 
minority leaning on an 
exterior metropolis, a 
diaspora or invisible 
feudal clans.
Declarative 
toleration for aliens 
is not unlimited. 
The incapacity 
of institutions to 
manage a growing 
mass of aliens. 
Racism, intolerance, 
ethnic purges as a 
consequence
The model 
application  
France The Anglo-Saxon 
countries.
The former socialist 
countries
The case with 
Germany at diﬀ erent 
stages of its history.
Source: author’s compilation based on Bourmeyster (1994, pp. 28-30)
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The heuristic aspects of a political culture approach
This process predetermines especially numerous aspects of modern European political identity. 
One usually deﬁ nes the term ‘political identity’ as a combination of preferences, historically based, 
for a deﬁ nite type of politics and political system. These preferences are in turn dependent on the 
speciﬁ cation of political culture, which is deﬁ ned by Almond and Powell (1966) as the pattern of 
individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of political system (Almond & 
Powell, 1966: 50).
In some academic circles, the investigation of the inﬂ uence of cultural factors on the changes in 
political systems is often vehemently criticised. As Samuel Huntington (1968) once wrote,
The concept of culture is a tricky one in social science because it is both easy and unsatisfying to use. It 
is easy (and also dangerous) to use because it is, in some sense, a residual category. If no other causes 
can plausibly explain signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences between societies, it is inviting to attribute them to culture. 
Just exactly how culture is responsible for the political and economic diﬀ erences one is attempting to 
explain is often left extraordinarily vague. Cultural explanations are thus often imprecise or tautological 
or both, at the extreme coming down to a more sophisticated rendering of ‘the French are like that!’ 
On the other hand, cultural explanations are also unsatisfying for a social scientist because they run 
counter to the social scientist’s proclivity to generalize. They do not explain consequences in terms of 
relationships among universal variables such as rates of economic growth, social mobilization, political 
participation, and civil violence. They tend, instead, to speak in particulars peculiar to speciﬁ c cultural 
entities (Huntington, 1968: 22-23).
It is evident, however, that no phenomenon in modern political life (the phenomenon of post-
totalitarianism, for example) can be properly understood without taking into consideration not 
only the cultural traditions, but also the peculiarity of national characters of the European nations, 
whose formation was the result of a long historical evolution. The role of historical conditions in the 
formation of national character was especially noted by Erich Fromm (1989),
It is argued that every nation demonstrates a typical ‘character-matrix’ with corresponding positive 
and negative consequences, so that every nation develops in diﬀ erent historical conditions certain basic 
character traits, which though not eternal, can, however, be preserved for many generations due to 
the inﬂ uence and change of various...factors. It is also supposed that this relatively constant character-
matrix is value-neutral and can lead, under certain conditions, to the development of positive character 
features, under other conditions — to negative ones (Fromm, 1989, p. 5).
Fromm’s observation is well conﬁ rmed by how diﬀ erent ways of overcoming the totalitarian legacy 
were in the post-communist Central Eastern Europe on the one hand and Russia on the other. The 
countries in which autonomous social structures such as inﬂ uential intellectuals and students, the 
Roman Catholic Church, independent trade unions, etc., had not completely degenerated, were found 
to be in the forefront of the ‘anti-totalitarian wave’. This fact testiﬁ es to the thesis on the conservation 
of traditions of political culture, which were formed in these countries during the capitalist period. 
On the contrary, the data of sociological surveys in Russia show that the reaction of the great part 
of the population quite corresponds to the traditions of political culture that were deﬁ ned by Almond 
and Powell as subject-participant. The main characteristic of this type is a combination of political 
conformism with a traditional conservative or religious perception of political realities (Almond & 
Powell, 1966, p. 50). The peculiarity of the Russian version of such a culture lies in the fact that 
the patriarchal traditions of the former monarchical state were spontaneously transformed by the 
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communist regime in a very special manner: Soviet totalitarianism and the old orthodox system of 
beliefs were well adapted to each other. Socialist radicalism inﬂ uenced only the forms of economic 
and political transformation as well as the character of ideological stereotypes.
All experience of post-communist constitutional experiments in Russia, ﬁ rst based on attempts to 
combine the US model of government with Soviet power and then borrow the main ingredients of 
constitutional practice of American and European presidential regimes, testiﬁ es to a quasi-democratic 
character of these experiments, which is quite compatible with traditions of domestic political 
culture. The awareness of this fact on the part of Russian scholars leads them, not infrequently, to 
quite pessimistic conclusions. As Molchanov wrote,
If there is one common element unifying otherwise dissimilar works on Russian politics and society, 
the theme of the unique Russian political culture might be it. Whether it is conceptualized as political 
culture, national character, or even destiny, the idea that Russian politics is somehow diﬀ erent from 
what we might ﬁ nd elsewhere has proven surprisingly resilient. In its more dogmatic reincarnation, this 
view holds that Russian political culture is doomed to be authoritarian. (Molchanov, 2002, pp. 4-5; cf. 
Brudny, Frankel, Hoﬀ man, 2004, pp. 8-12, pp. 52-67; Robertson, 2011, pp. 4, 212-214)
In either case, the orientation of the new post-communist leadership towards radical liberal 
reforms has from the very beginning predestined the paradoxical character of new Russian model of 
development: by rejecting both a socialist choice and a concept of gradual rebuilding of the Soviet 
system, Russia — a world power by its economic and military potential — acquired (without the formal 
loss of its international status) some essential parameters of a ‘third world’ state.
The experience of the post-war history of these states demonstrated that economic development 
and political stability are two independent goals and progress toward one has no necessary connection with 
progress toward the other. In some instances programs of economic development may promote political 
stability; in other instances they may seriously undermine such stability (Huntington, 1968, p. 6). At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the assumption that the post-communist states of Eastern Europe and Russia 
will form a dichotomy did not seem pessimistic. While Hungary, the Czech Republic, or Slovenia may 
entirely follow the path of Costa Rica, South Korea, and Taiwan, there exists a possibility for Russia to 
reproduce some less attractive Latin American models. In this situation, the inconsistency between 
government policies and the expectations of a great number of citizens is quite understandable and 
easily explicable. Modern Russian political culture can be regarded as a model example of a conﬂ ict 
type of political culture. It is not only contrary to the traditions formed in Western Europe and USA, 
as was already noted above, but also diﬀ ers considerably from the evolution of the political mentality 
that can be observed in Eastern Europe.
Anti-politics as a research model
It is important that political development, both in Russia and in Central and Eastern Europe, should 
primarily be investigated in modern Western literature with the help of the concept of anti-politics. 
The notion of anti-politics was introduced for better understanding the ways of legitimation of new 
political structures in post-communist countries. It implied that in the process of transition from 
totalitarian structures to democratic ones the state remains the decisive factor compensating for 
the absence of the appropriate premises for the creation of a market economy and the successful 
realisation of political reforms. In practice, during this transition, many complicated economic and 
social problems were solved, from the very beginning, within the framework of a speciﬁ c bureaucratic 
policy (Mänicke-Gyöngyösi, 1995, pp. 224-225).
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Anti-politics has, therefore, become the main way of providing freedom of action for a new 
bureaucracy that proved capable of proﬁ ting from Pareto’s advice to all rulers, transforming radical 
anti-communist moods and energy into such a type of leadership, where the institutionalisation 
of market and democracy was completely mediated by a tendency to general state guardianship 
(Mänicke-Gyöngyösi, 1995, pp. 225, 229; Grzymala-Busse, 2007, p. 182 sq.).
In such transitional conditions, the unity of power and the overwhelming majority of citizens are 
not secured with the real results of democratisation but rather with the help of ‘symbolic integration,’ 
which has to support a joint realization of democratic participation (Mänicke-Gyöngyösi, 1996, p. 13) and 
help to overcome the contradictions by enforcing a mechanism of reconciling the conﬂ icts in process 
of symbolic identiﬁ cation of citizens with basic democratic consensus (Mänicke-Gyöngyösi, 1996, pp. 13-
14; cf. Falk, 2003, pp. 6-9, 354 sq.).
But one should view the consequences of such a policy in Russia as very doubtful compared with 
its Eastern European versions. Now we realise more than ever that the liberal moods, which in Yeltsin’s 
era were the subject of optimistic prognoses, are mere elements of the ‘anti-politics’ conceived by 
radical pseudo-democrats for creating a ‘symbolic space’ to provide an ephemeral legitimacy of their 
own bureaucratic version of reforms (cf: Sakwa, 2008, p. 212-216).
The most visible special feature of the present time is the universal crisis of values. The striking 
easiness of rupture with socialist ideals by the majority of the population gives no promise that a 
program of painless gradual reforms will be brought to life. The cause of the disintegration of the 
USSR was not so much the rivalry of political elites but an unprecedented moral degradation of the 
society. Its typical manifestation lies, in particular, in the fact that part of the former nomenklatura 
and its ideologists who had come to power acted (instinctively, of course) in accordance with the old 
prescription proposed by Mussolini after the creation of the fascist regime in Italy: a suitable ideology 
can already be ordered after a successful solution of the main problem — political domination. At the 
present day, in a totally new situation, all the elements of a totalitarian order are well preserved — the 
dominance of politics over economy, state over society, and political will over economic and social 
interests.
The last elections of 2008 and 2012 showed that the legitimacy of the new political regime is 
not provided, because in a great majority of Russia`s regions the universal values of Western liberal 
democracies have now stepped back precipitously to the periphery of mass consciousness to the same 
extent as the values of the communist past (cf: Wydra, 2006, pp. 271-274). The only way out of the 
existing situation could be the elaboration and implementation of alternative program of reforms, 
embracing all the spheres of material and spiritual life of the Russian society.
The civic identity approach
Such a situation creates no premises for the implementation of a third component of identity — civic 
identity. By this notion, I imply an orientation towards a deﬁ nite type of citizenship and political 
education.
The modern conception of citizenship was outlined more than forty years ago by T. H. Marshall 
(1973) in his essay Citizenship and Social Class, in which the principal distinction between its political, 
civil and social aspects had been made as follows:
The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom — liberty of person, freedom 
of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right 
to justice [that is] the right to defend and assert all one’s rights on terms of equality with others and by 
due process of law’. The political element comprises ‘the right to participate in the exercise of political 
power as a member of the body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such 
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a body’. And the social element includes ‘the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security [and 
the] right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in society’ (Marshall, 1973, pp. 71-72; Beckett, 2006, pp. 37-41).
Following Marshall’s scheme, Adam Seligman insists, for instance, on the most profound 
diﬀ erences between Western democracies and post-socialist societies from the point of view of their 
relation to implementing this universal conception of citizenship. He writes,
And if we view the contemporary scene in both the East and the West, we see that the meaning of 
civil society — as normative concept — in both places reﬂ ects these diﬀ erent meanings of citizenship. 
Denied both civic and political rights during forty years of state socialism, civil society is, for many in 
contemporary Eastern and East-Central Europe, simply a model of civil and political citizenship that 
never existed... In all of those countries, with the only partial exception of Czecho-Slovakia, the liberal-
individualist tradition based on the principles of universal citizenship was extremely weak and never 
fully instituted (Seligman, 1992, p. 114).
I think this is true, of course, but only in part. The analysis of the evolution of the idea of citizenship 
on the basis of a West/East opposition would be too abstract, especially when American democratic 
citizenship is accepted as an ideal model. There are far more similarities between the Western and 
Eastern experience than one could imagine. Until the end of the nineteenth century, only a small 
minority of the European population could be classiﬁ ed as citizens. The great majority identiﬁ ed 
themselves rather as subjects. The real democratic revolution that drastically transformed human and 
political relations took place during the twentieth century.
It should be noted that the Russian October Revolution also made a big contribution to 
the development of the conception of citizenship in the same way as the French Revolution had 
contributed to its origins. I share Janowitz’s position when he writes,
Citizenship is not a formal and abstract conception. To the contrary, it is an idea loaded with concrete, 
speciﬁ c meaning which reﬂ ect the changing content of political conﬂ ict. In this sense the elements of 
citizenship are found in all nation-states, even in the most repressive, totalitarian ones. There is a crucial 
threshold, however, between democratic and nondemocratic citizenship (Janowitz, 1985, pp. X, 2).
While the norms of democratic citizenship were initially of West European origin, the historical 
experience of many European nations demonstrated a less favourable picture of the average 
citizen. Diﬀ erent countries had diﬀ erent reasons for the low development of the principle of mass 
participation — the revolutionary excesses in France, which produced a sense of incivism and hostility 
towards political discussions, the aristocratic institutions and deferential traditions of British politics, 
the traditions of authoritarian rule in Germany, etc. (Dalton, 1988, p. 14). As Bernard Berelson and his 
colleagues noted as early as in 1954,
Our data reveal that certain requirements commonly assumed for the successful operation of democracy 
are not met by the behaviour of the ‘average’ citizen... Many vote without real involvement in the 
election... The citizen is not highly informed on the details of the campaign... In any rigorous or narrow 
sense the voters are not highly rational (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954, pp. 307-310).
In 1960 these data were conﬁ rmed categorically by Angus Campbell and his co-authors in their 
landmark study ‘The American Voter’, in which a lack of ideological awareness or understanding by 
the American electorate was proven (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960).
All these peculiarities contributed to the elaboration of a constant image of the ‘unsophisticated 
citizen’, which was the basis of an elitist theory of democracy. As Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler 
wrote, 
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The survival of democracy depends upon the commitment of elites to democratic ideals rather than 
upon broad support for democracy by the masses. Political apathy and nonparticipation among the 
masses contribute to the survival of democracy. Fortunately for democracy, the antidemocratic masses 
are generally more apathetic than elites (Dye & Zeigler, 1970 p. 328).
The theory of the unsophisticated citizen developed the arguments of Joseph Schumpeter, who, 
at the beginning of the 1940s, expressed a fundamental doubt about the possibility the ‘classical 
conception of democracy’ being made a reality due to its incompatibility with human nature and the 
irrationalities of everyday human conduct. In the political sphere, as Schumpeter argued, education 
gives no advantages, because the sense of responsibility and rational choice it forms do not usually go 
beyond the limits of the citizens’ professional occupations. General political decisions are therefore 
found to be inaccessible to both educated classes and illiterate philistines. Thus the typical citizen drops 
down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political ﬁ eld. He argues and analyzes 
in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a 
primitive again (Schumpeter, 1976, p. 262). The democratic theory can, therefore, have some practical 
value only if it deﬁ nes the minimum necessary level of participation and leaves it to competing elites 
and bureaucracy to take major political decisions (Schumpeter, 1976, pp. 261, 262, 284-285).
Radical transformation in the characteristics of the Western general public occurred only during 
the last thirty years of the 20th century. The essential growth of the educational level of the American 
and West-European electorate has also changed the level of political sophistication, thus creating the 
premises for the development of the process that is usually described as a ‘cognitive mobilisation’. 
Cognitive mobilization means that citizens possess the level of political skills and resources necessary to 
become self-suﬃ  cient in politics. Instead of depending on elites and reference groups (external mobilization), 
citizens are now better able to deal with the complexities of politics and make their own political decisions 
(Dalton, 1988, p. 18). For example, in 1948 half of the American electorate was composed of people with 
primary education or less. By 1984 the college-educated portion of the electorate had grown to 40%.
Such a rise of citizen consciousness contributed to the development of the conception of 
deliberative democracy in the mid-1980s (Matthews, 1988; cf.  Rostboll, 2008, pp. 20-24). As Daniel 
Yankelovich wrote,
It is a democracy that revives the notion of thoughtful and active citizenship. Now citizenship is treated 
like a passive form of consumer behaviour. People fail at citizenship not because they are apathetic but 
because they do not think their actions or views make any real diﬀ erence. We need to expand the notion 
of citizen choice now conﬁ ned to elections to include making choices on the vital issues that confront 
us every day (Yankelovich, 1991, p. 240).
Political education as a solution?
It is quite natural that the problem of political education has become crucial in the discussions on 
this new democratic theory. In a civilised society, political culture and political education are not 
only inseparable from each other, but are also, in a deﬁ nite sense, equivalent. If one adheres to the 
above mentioned deﬁ nition of political culture suggested by Almond and Powell, one can regard 
political education as a complex system directly integrating those elements of culture that deﬁ ne the 
character of political socialisation in the process of formation of a deﬁ nite type of political conduct 
and consciousness, which form the property of a given society and state organisation.
The formation of the character and principles of citizenship is the immediate task of every modern 
political system. That is why the concept of political education often possesses a number of other 
equivalents [and expressions] — ‘civic education’, ‘citizenship education’, etc.
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It is surprising that political education had never been considered a priority till the1980s in spite of 
a most evident fact that its various conceptions had been developed in diﬀ erent systems of political 
philosophy, starting from the time of classical antiquity. In this connection, the complaint of one staﬀ  
member of the US Senate seems to be very signiﬁ cant, We’d like to promote citizenship education, but 
we can’t ﬁ gure out what it is. Everyone we ask gives us a diﬀ erent deﬁ nition (Remy & Turner, 1979, p. 1).
Therefore, it is quite important to cite a deﬁ nition suggested by Morris Janowitz, which appears to 
be most appropriate to the topic of this article,
By civic education we mean (a) exposing students to central and enduring political traditions of the 
nation, (b) teaching essential knowledge about the organization and operation of contemporary govern-
mental institutions, and (c) fashioning essential identiﬁ cations and moral sentiments required for 
performance as eﬀ ective citizens. Eﬀ ective civic education would result in increased understanding and 
meaningful national identiﬁ cations. It would strengthen civic consciousness. (Janowitz, 1985, p. 12)
So, in its narrow form, civic education focuses mainly on the attitudes of the student to the 
central agencies of government. In this connection, it is also important to note that the very concept 
of political education is often discussed in the context of citizen (or civic) rights and obligations. If by 
rights one means the legal, political and socio-economic prerogatives that the person enjoys because 
of the collective action of the political system and by obligations — the contributions and sacriﬁ ces 
a citizen makes to keep the political system eﬀ ective (Janowitz, 1985, p. 2), it also becomes evident 
that up to the present day the right-oriented conception of citizenship has been predominant both in 
Western and totalitarian democracies.
Thus, the right to be educated or informed has always been rated higher than the duty to be literate 
and educated. I use the term ‘informed’ in the Jeﬀ ersonian sense, which includes thoughtfulness, 
ethical soundness, and good judgment as well as factual information. Naturally, we should not 
confuse the compulsory laws that make parents send their children to school with the obligation to 
give them education. When liberally minded thinkers and scholars such as Robert Dahl and Isaiah 
Berlin declare accordingly, “We do not grant children the right to decide whether or not they shall go 
to school” or “We compel children to be educated”, they do not mean the obligation as a sphere of 
autonomous decisions but a mere collective demand, which is dependent on the necessity of every 
society to survive (Dahl 1990:16, Berlin 1984: 31).
This contradiction in the conception of the rights and their beneﬁ ts sometimes had a positive 
eﬀ ect on the elaboration of the theory of liberal education. The main principles of this theory were 
brilliantly formulated by William Morris, a pioneer of British socialism, in his essay How we live and 
how we might live,
Now the next thing I claim is education. And you must not say that every English child is educated now; 
that sort of education will not answer my claim, though I cheerfully admit it is something: something, 
and yet after all only class education. What I claim is liberal education; opportunity, that is, to have my 
share of whatever knowledge there is in the world according to my capacity or bent of mind, historical 
or scientiﬁ c, and also to have my share of skill of hand which is about in the world, either in the 
industrial handicrafts or in the ﬁ ne arts...; I claim to be taught, if I can be taught, more than one craft 
to exercise for the beneﬁ t of the community. (Morris, 1959, p. 440)
Nevertheless, in the modern world all models of political education are widespread. Any state 
aspires, independently of its distinctive features and general perception of politics, to control this 
process by means of taking centralised decisions, i.e. to carry out a deﬁ nite educational policy. In 
a democracy with a developed civil consciousness, the existence of independent public opinion is a 
suﬃ  cient guarantee for orientation towards the model of political education within the framework of 
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which the mechanism of civil society`s control over the state is supported and intensiﬁ ed. Sartory calls 
the system based on pluralism of interests with such attributes as autonomy and freedom ‘education’, 
opposing it to ‘indoctrination’, i.e. the inculcation of a single model of political conduct. Oakshott 
divides political education into ‘universal’ and ‘ideological’ based on learning a strictly deﬁ ned set of 
‘ideological texts’ (Sartori, 1987, p. 126, n.36; Oakshott, 1962, p. 116).
Only when it is free (relatively free, of course) from state control, can a speciﬁ cally Western model 
be called pluralist. It developed during a long evolution of both the institutes of state and the diﬀ erent 
systems of political philosophy. There are two main institutes in which the educational processes of 
this type have crystallised: 1) the system of universal (free) education in state and private schools; 
2) the modern university system. In both systems the three main aspects of political education 
are realised on diﬀ erent levels: a) formulating, securing, and transmitting the general principles of 
political mentality; b) mastering a wide circle of political sciences (the scientiﬁ c level of understanding 
politics and the phenomenon itself of the political); c) preparing for both participation in elections 
and professional political activity.
By exercising control over these institutes, the political elite is practically capable of inﬂ uencing 
the mode of political socialisation, and consequently all other spheres of social conduct (Almond 
& Powell, 1966, pp. 65-68). The scope of such control depends on the relation between education 
and indoctrination in educational programs (Dahl, 1990, p. 16; Berlin, 1984, p. 31), i.e. on the degree 
of development of civil liberties. Certain single elements of political education can be found under 
authoritarian regimes as well, but they quickly disappear after such regimes have been taken to their 
extremes and turn into one or another type of totalitarian state.
In Western Europe and the USA, the modern character of political education has formed under 
the great inﬂ uence of the optimistic conviction of intellectuals that it is possible to implement an 
educational reform through which the democratic system will reveal all of its advantages. As Dewey put 
it, we may produce in schools a projection in type of the society we would like to realize (Westbrook, 
1992, p. 192). Such orientation can already be discovered in Mill’s Considerations on representative 
government, who regards the very notions of ‘democratic government’ and ‘education’ as identical 
(Mill, 1958, pp. 31-32). By further developing Mill’s ideas about the advantages and inﬁ rmities of 
democracy, Adler notes:
No other form of government is to be preferred to democracy because of these inﬁ rmities, for all other 
forms of government are subject to the same inﬁ rmities, and they are not remediable in other forms 
of government, whereas remedies can be found for them in political democracy. The remedy for the 
incompetence of the rulers in a political democracy is the education of the people for their duties as 
citizens and as public oﬃ  cials. (Adler, 1991, p. 120)
In the works of Adler and his adherents, modern liberals, an optimistic conviction that a 
consolidation of the rationalistic base of democratic politics and its transformation into the main 
instrument of political education and socialisation are possible with the help of appropriate school 
programs and didactic methods, is expressed in a concentrated form. It is not accidental that partisans 
of such an approach unanimously reject the propagation of vocational education and defend the 
introduction of various programs of liberal education in all schools. As Adler aﬃ  rms, ‘vocational 
education is training for a speciﬁ c job in the economic machine. It aims at earning a good living, not 
living a good life. It is servile both in its aim and in its methods. It defeats democracy in the same way 
that economic servitude does’ (Adler, 1991, p. 126).
In the modern conception of political education, the liberal position is manifested also in the 
opposition of the notion of ‘civic consciousness’ to the traditional comprehension of nationalism and 
patriotism. As Janowitz aﬃ  rms,
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Civic education limited to inculcation of traditional patriotism or conventional nationalist ideology is 
obviously inadequate for an advanced industrial society and a highly interdependent world. I ﬁ nd the 
words national and patriotic limiting, and oﬀ er the term civic consciousness. It refers to positive and 
meaningful attachments a person develops to the nation-state. Civic consciousness is compatible with 
and required for both national and international responsibilities and obligations. It involves elements 
of reason and self-criticism as well as personal commitment. In particular, civic consciousness is the 
process by which national attachments and obligations are molded into the search for supranational 
citizenship. (Janowitz, 1985, pp. X-XI)
New interpretations of this conception of civic consciousness are also directed against the 
principle of state monopoly in the sphere of education, which implies the compulsory attendance of 
public schools. The decisive arguments in favour of the deployment of an alternative system of school 
education were formulated by von Hayek in his work The Constitution of Liberty:
If we accept the general argument for compulsory education, there remain three chief problems: How 
is this education to be provided? How much of it is to be provided for all? How are those who are to be 
given more to be selected and at whose expense? ... It is true that, historically, compulsory education 
was usually preceded by the governments’ increasing opportunities by providing state schools ... The very 
magnitude of the power over men’s minds that a highly centralized and government-dominated system 
of education places in the hands of the authorities ought to make one hesitate before accepting it too 
readily. Up to the point, the arguments that justify compulsory education also require that government 
should prescribe some of the content of this education ... There may be circumstances in which the case 
for authority’s providing a common cultural background for all citizens becomes very strong. (Hayek, 
1978, pp. 378-379)
At the beginning of the 21st century, these arguments that Hayek outlined have undoubtedly 
acquired a more practical character. Data from sociological surveys in American towns conﬁ rm the 
tendency to redistribute educational functions between public schools on the one hand and private 
Roman Catholic and Protestant schools on the other.
The approach to the analysis of new prospects in political knowledge and education would be 
impossible without taking account of those impulses to the development of liberal spirit that modern 
universities create. The question of the place of the university as a unique cultural phenomenon in 
democratic politics continues to be an object of animated discussion among champions of liberal 
and vocational education. One cannot aﬃ  rm categorically that all scholars and politicians support 
the opinion of J.H. Newman, the rector of the Catholic University in Dublin in the middle of the19th 
century. According to him, the main task of the university as a place where one can get access to 
‘universal knowledge’ which is ‘an end in itself’, has always been the ‘formation of mind’ as the 
process of training by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacriﬁ ced to some particular or 
accidental purpose, some speciﬁ c trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own 
sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture (Newman, 1852-1858, 
pp. I.VII,1).
A testimony to the opposite approach to the tasks of university education has been the practice 
of creating, since the latter part of the 19th century, vocational colleges and institutes, ﬁ rst within 
the old universities and, subsequently, new ‘technical universities’. It is certainly not by accident that 
the technological orientation process of universities has almost always been accompanied by their 
accusations of propagating revolutionary doctrines. These allegations came, of course, mainly from 
right-wing politicians and intellectuals. The new age of Russian history reproduces this tendency, 
conﬁ rming the idea that
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during a period of revolutionary social change such as the present, when revolutions are being 
overthrown by revolutions, the position of the university is inevitably dialectical; for both as institution 
and as idea, it is at one and the same time a seedbed of revolution and an object of attack by the 
revolution (Pelikan, 1992, p. 157).
It seems apparent that at present university education possesses its own, truly high status only in 
democratic societies. Accordingly, the university can only become the centre of new conceptions of 
political education when ideologically committed politics stays outside its walls. Naturally enough, 
the only language to be used within university walls is the language of history and philosophy 
(Oakshott, 1962, pp. 331-332). It is only possible when the ‘ﬁ rst principles’ of university education are 
well preserved, side by side with the
conviction that the tradition out of which the modern university has come is not to be dismissed as a 
quaint museum piece, with the ease and glibness that sometimes proceeds as though we in the present 
generation were free to deﬁ ne the university in any way we wish without attention to its heritage’ 
(Pelikan, 1992, p. 31).
There are various ways to preserve the tradition of free universal education. They sometimes 
might seem forced, even the only possible ones. At the end of the 1930s, when there was a widespread 
opinion that liberal values had been completely ruined under the attack of totalitarian dictatorships, 
Mannheim blamed liberal education for both the authoritarian degeneration of Germany and the 
incapacity of the modern democracies to handle fundamentally new situations (Mannheim, 2001, pp. 
8, 21, 135).
It is not diﬃ  cult to see that both the argumentation and conclusions made by Mannheim 
nowadays provide much more suitable ground for discussing the controversial problems surrounding 
the formation of a new conception of civic identity as well as the place and role of political education 
in modern Russia. It is evident that the transitional character of the political process, the state of 
the economy and social relations oﬀ er no chance for the realisation of the Western liberal model 
of democracy. Russia and some others countries of Eastern Europe enter again into the period that 
Weber, estimating the chances of Russian liberalism in the early 20th century, prophetically called 
the epoch of ‘pretended liberalism’ (Weber, 1988, p. 66). The combination of a declarative orientation 
towards the principles of constitutionalism with bureaucratic regulation opens up a real path to 
the gradual implementation of some elements of Schumpeter’s model of ‘social democracy’, with 
the competition of elites in the political sphere and the coexistence of capitalism and socialism in 
economy and ideology.
In a situation like this, state policy in the sphere of education will be one of the most important 
indicators of future political development. This thesis appears to be well grounded because the 
educational infrastructure left behind by the socialist state could (with appropriate support) become 
the sure guarantee of stability for the democratic choice.
The Soviet Union was a technotopia — a political regime promising its citizens a technological 
leap to a quantitatively better existence (Balzer, 1989, p. 1). The system of science and education 
supporting ideological claims was the largest in the world. Although the bulk of research projects was 
concentrated in special institutes of the Academy of Sciences, the training of specialists was carried 
out by technological institutes and universities. The university network was vast and leaned upon the 
strong tradition of universal school education.
Naturally, in the conditions where a single ideology dominated, the university was part of the 
Soviet ideocratic state. But the process of de-ideologisation, beginning with the ‘perestroika’, revealed 
the great role of university education in the formation of a new political culture.
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It is characteristic that in a stormy ﬂ ood of liberal rhetoric, which reached its culmination at the 
end of the 1980s, the problem of political education and the place of the university in its formation 
did not attract any attention. One only has to open the so-called ‘Bible of perestroika’ to realise it 
(Afanas’ev, 1988, pp. 97-121, 154-191, 635). The present day situation appears even more paradoxical: 
government policy in the sphere of science has put most of its structures on the verge of extinction, 
at the same time, it sanctioned the process of renaming many technical institutes universities. The 
connection between the trend towards overwhelming state control, dogmatisation of thought, and 
vocational orientation of education can hardly be considered accidental.
All these processes vividly demonstrate that the new conception of citizenship and political 
education may, in the conditions of a deep crisis, become the most important link binding the civil 
society (which is now at the initial stage of its development) and the new content of the political, 
making its way through the thicket of corporative interests. Only by relying upon education does 
Russian anti-politics have a chance to turn into a political discourse, provided the appropriate content. 
Otherwise the liquidation of educational structures will be a prologue to a new era of unsophisticated 
and manipulated citizens.
Conclusion
It is widely recognised now that eﬀ ective citizenship rests on a rigorous and viable system of civic 
education, which informs the individual of his civil rights and obligations. Therefore, the problem 
of national and civic identities as well as the criteria for their deﬁ nition has become crucial in the 
discussion of the concept of citizenship.
Citizenship can be deﬁ ned as a set of civil, political and social rights forming the foundation 
for civilised life in a political community. Citizenship is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that has 
produced diﬀ ering views of the concept. In this respect, the notion and the idea itself of citizenship 
very often overlap with the notions of nationality and nation-state.  For example, Marshall’s notion 
of citizenship was dependent upon a ﬁ rm link existing between the nation and the state: the state 
provides and guarantees rights, whilst the nation is the focus of identity (Beckett 2006: 41). Certainly, 
in the West citizenship can be characterised by an interiorised process of identiﬁ cation in the nation 
due to the deep-rooted democratic values, reﬂ ecting the ‘inner orientations’ of both individuals and 
groups. Even in the majority of post-communist states, which remained authoritarian at the early 
stage of their formation, the chief ‘motives’ for state exploitation consisted of both short-term survival 
and long-term commitments to democracy (Grzymala-Busse, 2007, pp. 2, 6; cf. Kaehne, 2007, pp. 141-153). 
Today, the modern conception of citizenship is also being discussed because of the decline in 
reference to the nation. Globalization has further dissipated political community. States become weaker 
and less able to deliver collective goods, increasing consumerist and privatized political action. National 
political cultures are similarly weakened by global market pressures to greater mobility and the enhanced 
ability to defect from collaborative arrangements (Bellamy, 2008, p. 118). The new notions of citizenship 
or identity based, for example, on the new Europe are distinctly diﬀ erent from the more traditional 
concept of nation-state citizenship: these notions are more diverse, less ethnocentric, more inclusive, 
etc. The outcomes of the discussions depend, as a rule, on how subjective is the perception of real 
political processes by scholars. In order to overcome various lopsided and subjective approaches, 
one should reconsider the controversial aspects of the modern theory of citizenship, especially in 
the period when the rapprochement of positions between some Eastern and the Western European 
countries is becoming more and more clear cut.
In the changing conditions determined by the advent of new forms of political culture, the intensiﬁ ed 
development of the democratic tradition of political and civic education becomes inevitable. The issue 
of new aspects of political education and its objectives has been an ongoing debate in politics since 
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the early 1990s. It remains to be seen whether a purely theoretical model of political education alone, 
i.e. without active citizens’ involvement and support, can have the potential not only to transform 
political culture, but also inﬂ uence the whole system of both school and university education. From 
this point of view, the analysis of political transformations with regard to the political, cultural and 
educational diversity in post-communist societies demonstrates that one cannot speak of one post-
communist Eastern Europe, which would imply homogeneity of the process of democratisation in the 
region, but rather of a marked divergence of the paths of political change in the countries joining the 
European Union, on the one hand, and the countries of the former Soviet bloc, on the other.
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